Aperture Book of the Month - September 2025

Joshua Cooper Ramo, ‘The Age of the Unthinkable’, New York, Hachette, 2009

It's no longer novel to describe the global environment as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Such continuous observation in the face of our human tendency to seek certainty can leave folks feeling confused and overwhelmed, at least in ‘western’ culture.

Unfortunately, far less time is invested in exploring why current attitudes, approaches, processes, and perspectives appear to struggle to deal with this apparent intractability. The persistence of most organisations in applying inadequate – linear, reductionist, and predictive – processes to navigating this challenge has long mystified and frustrated us and led to the development of our ‘Four Frames’ strategy design approach. We’re always pleased to learn we’re not alone, however, which is why we’ve gone back to 2009 and Joshua Cooper Ramo’s ‘The Age of the Unthinkable’ as our Book of the Month for August.

Ramo is uniquely positioned to comment on international relations, having served as a senior advisor to figures like Henry Kissinger and then as managing director of Kissinger Associates. This background gives him a rare vantage point, allowing him to dissect global power dynamics from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. He isn't just an academic; he's a veteran of the very systems he critiques.

The last sixteen years feels a long time when one considers how much has happened in global affairs since 2009. The full effect of the global financial crisis, the conclusion of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK’s departure from the European Union, the rise of popularism, and a global pandemic, not to mention prolonged conflict in Israel and Palestine, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Ukraine, have all presented complex challenges to institutions trying to navigate their complexity. And that’s not to mention dealing with increasing climate change, resource competition, and migration. Some have called it a permacrisis, others radical uncertainty. Things have changed. And yet, before most of this Gordian knot became even more intricately interwoven, Ramo points out that, “Some of the best minds of our era are still in thrall to an older way of seeing and thinking. They are making repeated misjudgments about the world.”

More than a decade later, Ramo’s core argument – that the traditional ‘physics of power’ has been replaced by a new, unpredictable reality – continues, serving as a powerful and unsettling guide to a world defined by what he then termed a ‘revolutionary avalanche of ceaseless change’. His central thesis is a firm demolition of any idea that our old ways of thinking about international affairs, politics, and power are still useful. He argues that we have moved from a linear, predictable world of cause and effect to one characterized by non-linear systems, complexity, and inherent unpredictability. This shift, he posits, means that our well-intentioned plans inevitably go awry; our attempts to solve problems with old tools only make them worse.

Applying systems thinking to geopolitics. Ramo draws on a wide range of disciplines – from complexity theory and network science to psychology and immunology – to illustrate his points. He presents concepts like the ‘sandpile effect’, where the addition of a single grain of sand can trigger a catastrophic avalanche, to explain how minor events can have outsized and unpredictable consequences in a complex system. This focus on emergent properties and self-organization aligns closely with the work of thinkers like Fritjof Capra, who has long argued for a shift from a mechanistic worldview to one that understands the interconnectedness of all things. Ramo applies this thinking to the grand strategic level, stressing the necessity to think of nations, economies, and conflicts not as machines to be directed and controlled but as dynamic, living systems that must be engaged with and influenced.

Ramo’s book is most compelling for his diagnosis of the problem, providing plenty of examples to show how conventional wisdom has failed. He contrasts the Cold War’s seemingly clear-cut state-on-state dynamics, for example, with the decentralised, resilient character of contemporary non-state organisations. He also critiques the common fallacy that the fall of the Soviet Union was a linear ‘victory’ for the West, arguing instead that it was systemic, as much about internal rigidity as external influence.

Identifying the need for a new approach based on ‘deep security’, resilience, and adaptability, Ramo argues that we should focus on building robust systems that can withstand shocks rather than trying to predict and prevent every possible threat. This demands a shift from a direct to an indirect approach. For some readers, he may assume too much in expecting society’s increased collaboration and cooperation in pursuing his vision.

Ramo’s thesis is brought to life by a series of engaging and instructive vignettes. He explores and illustrates theories of international relations, Cold War strategy, Cubism, ancient Chinese art and philosophy, military intelligence doctrine, Hezb’ollah, and the South African AIDS epidemic. His cast of characters ranges from Alan Greenspan to Hans Morgentahau, from Friedrich von Hayek to Henry Kissenger, and from Victor Hugo, Isaiah Berlin, and Nils Bohr to CS Holling, Brian Arthur, and Simon Levin. It’s a heady mix and hugely informative.

‘The Age of the Unthinkable’ is a compelling and thought-provoking analysis that successfully dismantles outdated modes of thinking and provides a new lens through which to view our chaotic times. It offers an intellectual framework demanding a systemic approach asking the right questions; a timely and timeless call to abandon the comfort of old habits and to embrace a world where the only constant is change itself. When published, in 2009, it should have provoked discussion about how our institutions might adapt to the demands of a new international environment. That we are still struggling to move beyond his diagnosis to a prescription for changing our approach is alarming.