The Enduring Reality of Power: A Thucydidean Analysis of US Foreign Policy

Written on 5 Jan 26, following the US intervention in Venezuela

For the last century at least, the foreign policy of the United States has claimed to rest on moral principles: the defence of democracy, the protection of human rights, and the maintenance of a rules-based international order. One of the earliest commentaries – and still perhaps the most profound – on the principles of international relations is Thucydides’ for whom such principles were often mere rhetorical veils for the stark and timeless realities of power. We may have seen that play out over the last few months in the White House and culminate in the last twenty-four hours in Caracas. Let us not search for a sophisticated analysis; the recently published US National Security Strategy and the intervention in Venezuela reveals a policy driven by Thucydides’ eternal trinity of fear, honour, and interest.

The National Security Strategy: Fear and the Great Power Competition

Thucydides famously argued that the fundamental cause of the Peloponnesian War was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this inspired in Sparta. The US National Security Strategy, in its focus on ‘Great Power Competition’, presents a modern inversion of this dynamic. The strategy is not driven by the growth of US power, but by the perceived threat to its long-held hegemony from rising rivals, specifically China and Russia.

"The real cause, however, I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight: the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable."

The NSS is, at its core, a document born of Thucydidean fear (phobos). This fear manifests in several ways:

1. Fear of Decline: The primary strategic goal is to ‘out-compete’ rivals and prevent the erosion of the US-led global order. This is a defensive posture, indicative of a ruling power recognizing a challenge to its supremacy. The NSS must aggressively reassert its global position precisely because it fears losing it.

2. Fear of Encroachment: The strategy frames China's technological and economic expansion as an existential threat. For Thucydides, the control of allied states and trade routes was paramount. The US strategy reflects a modern fear that rivals will successfully carve out spheres of influence, diminishing US economic and security interest (ōphelia).

3. Fear for Prestige (Timē): International prestige, or timē, was vital to ancient city-states. The NSS’s insistence on ‘re-establishing leadership’ and projecting strength is a testament to the imperative of honour. A hegemon cannot be seen to retreat or tolerate defiance without inviting further challenges. The strategy's emphasis on alliances is not purely ideological; it is a pragmatic move to share the burden and reinforce the US-centered structure, protecting its global timē.

Thus, Thucydides might view the NSS not as a defence of values, but as the candid articulation of a great power's strategy to maintain its dominance by mitigating its fears and securing its material interests against inevitable challengers.

The Venezuela Intervention: The Melian Dialogue Revisited

The pressure exerted on Venezuela – through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military escalation – provides an interesting contemporary illustration of the Melian Dialogue. This famous dialogue between the powerful Athenians and the neutral Melians strips bare the moral veneer of international relations, concluding with the brutal aphorism: ‘The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’.

"Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

When analysing the intervention in Venezuela, Thucydides would systematically ignore the US appeals to democracy and human rights and instead focus on the power differential:

• The Rejection of Justice (Dikaion): Venezuela’s appeals to state sovereignty, international law, and the principle of non-interference – the dikaion – would be deemed irrelevant by the US, the strong power. Just as the Athenians told the Melians that justice only mattered between equals, the US’s actions confirm that its national interest (ōphelia) in regional stability, oil access, and the rejection of anti-American models in its immediate sphere outweighs any claims to international law made by a weak state.

• The Supremacy of Expediency: The US did not intervene out of selfless concern, but because it was expedient to do so. The presence of an adversarial regime in the Western Hemisphere is deemed a direct challenge to the US’s honour (timē) as the regional hegemon and a threat to its long-term security interest (ōphelia). For the Athenians, power created the right to rule; for the US, power creates the right to intervene unilaterally within its sphere of influence.

• The Lack of Parity: Venezuela, being unable to significantly retaliate or mobilize powerful counter-alliances, was forced into the position of the weak. Its defiance, like that of the Melians, was ultimately punished, not because its domestic system was inherently worse than others tolerated by the US, but because its government refuses to align with the dominant power’s interests.

The Venezuela intervention demonstrates the fundamental Thucydidean law of power: when vital interests are at stake and the power differential is overwhelming, appeals to morality are futile.

The Corcyraean Revolution: The Corruption of Language

In his account of the Corcyraean Revolution, Thucydides details how prolonged civil conflict led to the corruption of political language, where ‘reckless daring was held to be loyal courage’ and ‘prudent hesitation was held to be cowardice’.

"The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these motives proceeded the violence of the factions once they were engaged in contention."

Thucydides would observe a similar dynamic in the rhetoric of recent US foreign policy, where the language of democracy and freedom is bent to serve the demands of power:

• Democracy as Expediency: The term ‘supporting democracy’ becomes a tool of policy, applied selectively to regimes that support US interests (even if imperfectly democratic) and withheld from adversaries (even if they possess some popular support). The intervention in Venezuela is framed as a democratic crusade, yet the underlying motivation is the restoration of US regional timē and ōphelia.

• Human Rights as Justification: While humanitarian concerns may be real, Thucydides would be sceptical of their prioritisation. He would note that US actions overlook human rights abuses in strategically important or allied states, using the issue primarily as a legitimate-sounding justification for isolating and sanctioning an opponent. The moral argument serves as the permissible public face for a policy rooted in self-interest.

Conclusion

“Of all the manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most.”

A Thucydidean analysis of US foreign policy strips away the ideological framework to reveal the skeletal structure of power politics. The National Security Strategy is a manifestation of a great power's fear of decline and its imperative to secure its honour and global interests against rising competition. The intervention in Venezuela is the tragic, yet inevitable, execution of the Melian doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, where the strong do what they can to maintain regional control, regardless of the claims of international law.

Thucydides offers a deeply cynical, perhaps simple, conclusion: all states, whether ancient Athenian empires or modern global superpowers, are fundamentally governed by the same enduring, amoral forces of power and self-preservation. The US, for all its democratic ideals, remains tethered to the iron laws of realism laid down over two millennia ago. There’s no sophistication to be seen here, just the blunt edge of power. And hubris. One might ask how that played out for Athens…